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Radical technological innovations are needed to achieve sustainability, but such innovations confront
unusually high barriers, as they often require sociotechnical transitions. Here we use the theoretical
perspectives and methods of Science and Technology Studies (STS) to demonstrate ways that existing
theories of innovation and sociotechnical transitions, such as the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP), can be
expanded. We test the MLP by applying STS methods and concepts to analyze the history of aircraft
composites (lightweight materials that can reduce fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions), and
use this case to develop a better understanding of barriers to radical innovation. In the MLP, "radical
innovation" occurs in local niches—protected spaces for experimentation—and is then selected by a so-
ciotechnical regime. The history of composite materials demonstrates that radical innovation could not
be conﬁned to "niches," but that the process of scaling up to a wholly new product itself required radical
innovation in composites. Scaling up a process innovation to make a new product itself required radical
innovation. These ﬁndings suggest a need to reﬁne sociotechnical transitions theories to account for
technologies that require radical innovation in the process of scaling up from the level of sociotechnical
niche to regime.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
On October 26 2011, the Boeing 787 made its ﬁrst commercial
ﬂight on a route from Tokyo to Hong Kong, and set a new standard
for fuel efﬁciency. The 787 “Dreamliner” achieves the highest ef-
ﬁciency among mid-sized airliners by using several innovative
technologies, including lightweight composite materials that ac-
count for approximately 50% of the aircraft’s weight. Launch cus-
tomer All Nippon Airlines reported that the aircraft is 21% more
fuel-efﬁcient than its predecessor. More signiﬁcantly, Boeing’s
decision to build the Dreamliner has triggered a broader shift in
aircraft manufacturing. As orders for the Dreamliner began pour-
ing in, Boeing’s arch rival, Airbus, promised that its direct com-
petitor to the 787, the A350, would boast 53% composite con-
struction (Wall, 2008).
The industry’s shift towards composite construction is good
news for advocates of energy efﬁciency, but it also raises a key
question: why did the industry not fully embrace these innovative
materials earlier? As Fig. 1 shows, airliners have used compositer Ltd. This is an open access article
nardi, G., Radical innovation
), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/jcomponents for decades. Indeed, one business aircraft, the
Beechcraft Starship, was built entirely from composites in 1985,
and remains operational today, a decade after the manufacturer
decided to decommission it (Scherer, 2010). Why has commercial
aviation adopted composite materials so slowly, and what policies
might enable greater use of weight-saving materials?
By addressing these questions, this paper aims to clarify the-
ories of how technological innovations cross the “valley of death”
to enter wide-spread use. As innovation scholars have noted, new
innovations may struggle to enter markets, both because they
initially have relatively poor performance (Mokyr, 1990 calls them
hopeful monstrosities) and because they must be compatible with
a broader sociotechnical regime—a complex, heterogeneous, and
interdependent network of organizations, artifacts, engineering
practices, skilled workers, government policies, ﬁnancing systems
and consumers. Such regimes encourage incremental innovations,
which improve price and performance of technologies already in
the market, while discouraging radical innovations, which are
discontinuous and can cause regime change (Freeman and Perez,
1988).
Evolutionary economists initially coined the “regime” concept
to describe the rule-sets that govern decisions about how to de-
velop and produce new technologies (Nelson and Winter, 1977,
1982; Dosi, 1982). Regimes encourage what engineer-historianunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Fig. 1. Percentage of aircraft mass comprised of composite materials (initial
conﬁguration).
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based upon known concepts and technologies, rather than “radical
design,” in which engineers must develop new knowledge as well
as new artifacts. Rip and Kemp (1998) expanded the notion of
regime to include the rules shared by technology’s “selection en-
vironment.” Geels coined the notion of “sociotechnical regime” to
describe a larger set of rules—those held by policymakers, user
groups, ﬁnanciers, and so on (Geels, 2002). This paper deﬁnes
sociotechnical regimes broadly to include artifacts and organiza-
tions, a usage that is common in the literature (see e.g. (Kemp
et al., 1998)), and explicit in Gabrielle Hecht’s notion of “techno-
political regimes” (Hecht, 2001; Allen & Hecht, 2001).
Regimes can create interdependencies that cause “technologi-
cal lock-in,” a situation in which new innovations are unable to
succeed, even if they are superior to established technology (Un-
ruh, 2000; David, 1985; Arthur, 1989). Radical innovations often
depend on the integration of many interdependent systems to
succeed; although they may be “generic” in their ability to trans-
form many industries and applications, radical innovations can
rarely slot into a modular framework in a “plug-and-play” manner
(Christensen et al., 2015; Maine and Garnsey, 2006). In particular,
downstream obstacles in the value chain often need resolving
before adoption can take off (Musso, 2009). Future improvements
in such radical innovations are hard to predict when those in-
novations are still immature, and may not follow the traditional
‘learning curve’ seen in more mature technologies (Linton and
Walsh, 2004).
Scholars have developed several frameworks for analyzing how
such innovations can be successfully introduced into regimes.
Kemp, Schot, and Hoogma proposed creating “strategic niches,”
protected spaces for technological innovation and experimenta-
tion by a broad range of stakeholders, including researchers,
companies, policymakers, and end-users of technology (Kemp,
Schot and Hoogma, 1998). Rotmans, Kemp, and van Asselt broa-
dened the notion of niche management to overall transition
management (Rotmans et al., 2001).
Thinking about transitions has also been heavily inﬂuenced by
the multi-level perspective (MLP), which treats sociotechnical re-
gimes as an intermediate level between local niches and over-
arching landscapes (Geels, 2002, 2005a, 2006b, 2011, 2014; Elzen
and Geels, 2004; Geels and Schot, 2007; Raven and Geels, 2010;
Sutherland et al., 2015; Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014). Accord-
ing to Geels and Schot (2007, p. 400), “transitions come about
through interactions between processes at these three levels:
(a) niche-innovations build up internal momentum, through
learning processes, price/performance improvements, and supportPlease cite this article as: Slayton, R., Spinardi, G., Radical innovation
technical transitions. Technovation (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/from powerful groups, (b) changes at the landscape level create
pressure on the regime and (c) destablization of the regime creates
windows of opportunity for niche innovations.”
Conceptual frameworks such as strategic niche management
and the MLP helpfully broaden evolutionary economic approaches
to sociotechnical transitions by emphasizing social and cognitive
dimensions of innovation and selection (Geels 2006a, b; Raven and
Geels, 2010; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008). However, most of the
literature focuses on what innovation scholars have dubbed
“product innovations,” which are associated with new end-pro-
ducts, rather than “process innovations,” which improve the per-
formance of existing products (Tornatzky and Fleischer, 1990;
Abernathy and Utterback, 1978). Advanced materials, such as the
composites discussed here, are examples of process innovations,
which have been shown to confront unique challenges for value
creation (Maine and Garnsey, 2006; Maine, Lubik and Garnsey,
2012; Linton and Walsh, 2008, 2004)
Furthermore, we argue that transition theories in general, and
the MLP in particular, could be reﬁned by more systematically
applying methods drawn from science and technology studies
(STS). In what follows, we brieﬂy outline three ways in which
transition theories could beneﬁt from STS insights. We then use
these methods to analyze the development of a “niche” for com-
posite aircraft components, and efforts to scale up that niche to a
potentially regime-changing aircraft—the Dreamliner. Whereas
the sociotechnical transitions literature generally argues that ra-
dical innovations are developed in niches, and subsequently se-
lected by the dominant regime, this case study shows that some
technologies must undergo radical innovation in the process of
scaling up from the niche to regime level. We argue that STS
methods and concepts can help the transitions literature to ac-
commodate the need to take radical innovation beyond the niche.2. Methods and theoretical perspective
Like many studies of sociotechnical transitions, we adopt a case
study method, using the history of composites development and
Boeing’s Dreamliner experience to extend and reﬁne existing
theories. However, our approach is different than most existing
studies in three ways which reﬂect the theoretical perspective and
methods of STS.
First, while sociotechnical transitions theory has primarily been
developed through case studies of innovations that successfully
effected transitions, we focus on a partial or incomplete transition.
This contributes to a theoretical perspective that follows the STS
‘symmetry principle,’ in which success and failure both require
sociological explanation (Pinch and Bijker, 1987). Although there
are a few case studies of innovations that have yet to cause tran-
sitions (Hofman and Elzen, 2010; Elzen et al., 2011; Grünewald
et al., 2012; Raven and Geels, 2010; Geels, 2014), frameworks such
as the MLP have primarily been used to study successful transi-
tions (Bunduchi et al., 2011; Turnheim and Geels, 2012; Hall et al.,
2014; Geels, 2005b, 2002, 2006a; Geels and Schot, 2007; Berggren
et al., 2015; Rosenbloom and Meadowcroft, 2014). Geels and Schot
(2010, p. 79) note that theorization would be improved by cor-
recting ‘the bias towards winners and novelty’. Similarly, Wells
and Nieuwenhuis (2012) argue that the literature focuses on
causes of change at the cost of understanding “transition failure.”
Second, rather than pre-deﬁning composite aircraft compo-
nents as either “incremental” or “radical” innovations, we focus on
how different types of actors in the commercial aviation regime
have conceptualized these innovations. This methodological
choice reﬂects the STS emphasis on the interpretive ﬂexibility of
technology (Pinch and Bijker, 1984). Different actors could view
the same innovation as relatively radical or conservative,in scaling up: Boeing’s Dreamliner and the challenge of socio-
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conception of an incremental (and therefore low-risk) innovation
was a resource for Boeing executives in the debate about whether
the 787 was too risky. This analysis of what counts as conservative
or radical contrasts with the approach of many innovation studies,
which tend to adopt a structural rather than a “micro-level” view.
As Geels and Schot have noted, the global theory of the MLP ‘needs
to be complemented by local theories which help to analyze how
actors navigate, struggle and negotiate on speciﬁc alternatives’
(2010, 101).
Third, we take seriously the injunction of STS to “open the black
box” of technology, by considering how speciﬁc technical chal-
lenges affect the process of regime change. Our results suggest the
need to broaden existing frameworks to account for aspects of
technological design. In particular, we ﬁnd that signiﬁcant in-
novation (and according to many observers, radical innovation) in
composite manufacturing was needed in order to scale up from
niche applications of composites (e.g. tail pieces) to regime-
changing applications (e.g. fuselage and wings). This ﬁnding
complicates the dominant framework for sociotechnical transi-
tions, in which radical innovation is conﬁned to protected niches,
and scaling-up requires only incremental adjustments to the new
technology. We argue the composites case illustrates a type of
innovation-driven transition that merits further study. Further-
more, we suggest that closer attention to technological speciﬁcity
can address the MLP’s acknowledged need for a more complete
understanding of how niches and regimes interact to cause so-
ciotechnical transitions (Schot and Geels, 2008).
We draw our empirical data from primary sources, including
industry journals, government reports, and mainstream media.
One reason for relying on primary sources is the dearth of sec-
ondary literature about the evolution of composites in aviation.
Another reason is that primary sources are better suited for
gaining a micro-level understanding. Aviation Week & Space
Technology (AW&ST), a major industry journal reporting interna-
tional news on both civil and military aviation, served as one
signiﬁcant source of data. The Lexis–Nexis database, which con-
tains all AW&ST articles from 1975 to the present, was searched
using keywords such as “composites,” “carbon ﬁber” (the type of
composite most commonly used in aircraft components), “Boeing”
and “787”. These searches produced thousands of pages of docu-
ments. We also studied industry, academic, and government re-
ports on composites manufacture, as well as popular news articles
about the use of composites in commercial aviation. These reports
provided a consensus view of the state-of-the-art in composites
manufacture, and how the state-of-the-art changed over time.
Finally, we examined articles about the Dreamliner in the popular
media to incorporate public perceptions and stakeholders into the
analysis.
In the remainder of this paper, we ﬁrst describe how the
composites niche was established in commercial aviation, and
outline speciﬁc lessons learned. We then discuss why Boeing
decided to develop a plane with an all-composite wing and fu-
selage, and the difﬁculties the company faced in scaling up com-
posite components. As we will see, Boeing was forced to undertake
radical innovation in the process of increasing the size and com-
plexity of components, which could not have been accomplished
in the niche of small aircraft components.3. Understanding the niche for composite aircraft components
In this section we describe how aerospace use of composite
materials developed, and how signiﬁcant use of composites in
primary structural elements of aircraft required advances in
knowledge with regard to both manufacturing processes andPlease cite this article as: Slayton, R., Spinardi, G., Radical innovation
technical transitions. Technovation (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/joperational safety.
3.1. Landscape pressure and niche creation
Composite aircraft components typically consist of reinforcing
ﬁbers (most commonly carbon) embedded in a resin (most com-
monly an epoxy). High strength carbon ﬁber was ﬁrst developed at
Union Carbide in the late 1950s, with efﬁcient manufacturing
processes developed in both the UK and Japan in the early 1960s
(Spinardi, 2002). Several properties of carbon ﬁber drew special
attention. Its strength was comparable to that of metal but at a
much lighter weight, a property that would enable military aircraft
to enhance their speed, range, and performance.
Unfortunately, composites such as carbon ﬁber also came with
signiﬁcant disadvantages: high production cost, uncertainties
about methods for maintenance and long-term costs, and new
risks to safety. Thus, they were used only in niche applications in
the aerospace industry. Military forces were willing to pay the
extra cost of composites in order to reduce weight and improve
the performance of ﬁghter aircraft. Composites’ ability to with-
stand high temperatures also made them very valuable for appli-
cations in missiles and space vehicles. “Landscape” pressures,
speciﬁcally the Cold War arms race and space race, nurtured this
early niche, and use of composites grew rapidly in the 1970s and
early 1980s (Fig. 1). For example, in the late 1970s, British Aero-
space Corp and the German Messerschmitt–Boelkow–Blohm be-
gan replacing tailerons in the Tornado—a ﬁghter plane jointly
produced by Great Britain, West Germany, and Italy—with carbon
ﬁber components. The companies aimed to gain experience that
would enable greater use of carbon ﬁber in future ﬁghters (Staff,
1979b).
In the 1970s, new landscape pressures—the energy crisis and
the rising price of oil—encouraged commercial aircraft manu-
facturers to use lighter weight materials. Airlines became more
willing to shoulder higher production costs in order to save on
operating costs. Aluminum manufacturers responded to the oil
crisis and competition from composite components by developing
lighter weight aluminum alloys, but even the lightest weight
aluminum alloys were heavier than carbon ﬁber. In 1982, Airbus
manufactured one of the ﬁrst airliners to contain composites, the
A310, with a carbon ﬁber vertical tail ﬁn and carbon brakes. The
carbon brakes alone saved 1100 pounds, more than any other
component (Lenorovitz, 1985). Airbus went further with its A320,
the ﬁrst commercial aircraft to use an all-composite tail, making
the plane approximately 20% composite by weight (Younossi et al.,
2001).
These developments gave composites manufacturers cause for
optimism. In 1981, one production engineer predicted that aircraft
would be more than 50% composite construction by the end of the
1990s (King, 1981). British, German, and French companies were
all planning to design and manufacture ﬁghter aircraft that would
use 40% composites by weight, and the proposed British P-110
ﬁghter was to include a wing that was 80% composites by weight
(Staff, 1980). Lockheed bolstered its carbon ﬁber manufacturing
capabilities, predicting that composites would comprise 40% of
ﬁghter/attack aircraft weight by 1990 (Kolcum, 1986). Similarly, in
1983, the Dutch aircraft company Fokker announced that its next
commercial aircraft, to be introduced in 1992, would consist of 50-
65% composite materials by weight (Feazel, 1983).
Although fuel prices dropped in the mid-1980s, returning air-
lines to their traditional focus on initial cost of production rather
than potential fuel savings (Feazel, 1985), both airlines and man-
ufacturers remained optimistic about composites. Ernst Simon,
Lufthansa’s general manager of engineering, noted that a 10% re-
duction in weight would increase Lufthansa’s proﬁts by $20 mil-
lion/year, and predicted that manufacturers would introduce anin scaling up: Boeing’s Dreamliner and the challenge of socio-
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composite suppliers predicted that sales of non-metallic materials
would grow at a rate of 15–18% over the decade (Velocci, 1991). An
economic downturn encouraged commercial manufacturers to
again seek ways of improving fuel efﬁciency, and composites saw
growing use in cabin design as a result (Ott, 1993). An interest in
fuel efﬁciency also drove Fokker and the Netherlands’ National
Aerospace Laboratory to launch a 5 year research program to re-
duce the costs of producing composites, aiming to produce an all-
composite wing by the late 1990s (Staff, 1994).
In the 1990s commercial aircraft increasingly used composites
for relatively small components, such as tail ﬁns, horizontal sta-
bilizers, and landing gear. But they did not use composites for the
largest and most high-risk parts of the aircraft: the fuselage and
wings. By the turn of the millennium, no airliner had more than
20% composite construction. To understand why aircraft manu-
facturers did not attempt an all-composite wing or fuselage earlier,
we must consider what carbon ﬁber’s market niche did, and did
not, enable manufacturers to learn.
3.2. Learning about manufacturing
The key point to understand about composite materials is that
they are produced at one and the same time as the composite
structure. Thus, the ﬁnal properties of the material are strongly
inﬂuenced by the shape of the component itself. Additionally, the
process of manufacturing composite aircraft components is highly
labor-intensive and speciﬁc to the particular component. This
meant that knowledge of how to manufacture small components
(the focus of the composite niche) could only partially be applied
to efforts to manufacture much larger components. This section
brieﬂy summarizes some of the learning that took place in the
niche of small composites.
Most composite component manufacturers begin with sheets
of pre-impregnated carbon ﬁber, consisting of bundles of ﬁber
pressed into a resin. This “pre-preg” or “pre-form” must then be
molded into the appropriate shape. By the turn of the new mil-
lennium, the two most common ways of producing composite
components for aircraft were resin transfer molding (RTM) and
ﬁber (or tape) layup. In the RTM process, carbon ﬁber preform is
placed within a mold, the mold is closed, and resin is injected into
the mold. The part is then cured under high temperature and
pressure. The primary advantage of RTM is its ability to produce
complex shapes reproducibly and precisely. Unfortunately the
mold must be made of expensive materials to withstand high
temperatures and pressures (Younossi et al., 2001). Nonetheless,
because RTM could be highly automated, for large production runs
it was competitive with aluminum by the early 1990s (Staff, 1990).
The layup process is much more difﬁcult to automate. It begins
with designing and building a tool that will be used as a substrate
for the carbon ﬁber or tape, thereby giving the ﬁnal component its
shape. For each part, plies are cut by hand or with automated
cutting equipment. Next, workers place the plies on the tool by
hand, using Mylar templates or optical projection systems as a
guide. Since the directional strength and stiffness of the parts
comes from the alignment of these ﬁbers, it is crucial that workers
lay the plies in the correct order and direction. Parts can have up to
80 plies that must be properly stacked and aligned. After laying
the plies, the workers apply pressure to compact the pile and re-
move any voids.
After the plies are laid and compressed, workers place addi-
tional materials over the part to ensure that the plies lay ﬂat while
also allowing excess resin to bleed out of the assembly while it is
curing. Workers then enclose the entire assembly in a heat-proof
plastic bag and place it in an autoclave, which applies heat and
pressure to cure the part. Depending on the type of resin beingPlease cite this article as: Slayton, R., Spinardi, G., Radical innovation
technical transitions. Technovation (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/used, the curing process can range from 5–11 hours, at tempera-
tures ranging from 350–600 °F, and pressures of 100–200 psi
(Hughes, 1990). The parts sometimes also go through a postcure
cycle. After curing is complete, workers inspect and trim the part.
At the turn of the millennium, a review concluded that the laying
up and compacting the plies accounted for over 40% of the labor
required for part fabrication, while compressing, bagging, in-
specting and trimming comprised another 40% (Younossi et al.,
2001).
Tacit knowledge—non-codiﬁed knowledge residing in the
hands of workers and organizational arrangements of companies
(see e.g. MacKenzie and Spinardi, 1995)—was thus critical to pro-
ducing composite components reliably. Nonetheless, manu-
facturers were able to reduce costs by developing techniques for
automating some tasks. For example, automated tape laying ma-
chines, which cut and place tape from a spool, came into wide-
spread use in the 1980s. However, they were only suitable for large
skins with minimal contours (Younossi et al., 2001).
By the early 1980s, automated processes enabled manu-
facturers to produce some components less expensively with
carbon ﬁber than metal. Although composite materials remained
much more expensive than metal, the complex process of cutting
and assembling many metal parts was labor intensive and gener-
ated signiﬁcant amounts of scrap. Raw materials accounted for
about 20% of the cost of a ﬁghter aircraft, with the complex
manufacturing and assembly process accounting for the rest (King,
1981). Since composite components generated little scrap and
were fabricated as seamless wholes, they reduced assembly costs
and were a promising alternative.
Nonetheless, metal retained advantages for components that
could be fabricated with relatively little scrap metal and few
subassemblies. Metal components could also be more easily as-
sembled because they could be slightly reshaped as needed to
mate with other parts. By contrast, since most composites cannot
be reshaped after curing, composite components required more
precise manufacturing to ensure a good ﬁt. Assembling composite
components also required special tools and fasteners that could be
very expensive. For example, in the mid-1990s, an automatic fas-
tener could cost as much as $100 per hole because of the time
required to drill, measure, and inspect the hole, as well as the cost
of special fasteners (Vosteen and Hadcock, 1994).
Perhaps most signiﬁcantly, automation could not eliminate the
need for tacit knowledge. Even the most automated composite
construction processes require skilled workers to intervene at key
moments, such as manually debulking, bagging, and inspecting
parts. The need for tacit knowledge also prevented the easy
transfer of skills from one project to another. In 1994 a NASA-
commissioned study noted that technology transfer rarely oc-
curred “via technical reports, presentations, lectures and courses,”
but “was best accomplished by having experienced and in-
experienced people working together” (Vosteen and Hadcock,
1994). Additionally, because composite components could not be
readily reshaped after fabrication, design and production teams
could not be readily separated: the “close involvement of manu-
facturing/assembly personnel in the design process is essential to
strike the proper balance between design requirements and the
need for producibility” (Vosteen and Hadcock, 1994).
The composites niche thus provided valuable lessons about
automation and the organization of manufacturing and assembly
teams. But it also made clear that experience with small compo-
nents was a limited guide for dealing with larger components.
Throughout the 1990s, concerns about the high cost of production
discouraged airline manufacturers from pursuing large composite
components. For example, in October 1991 Airbus announced that
its new extra-large, 600 seat airplane would not use a composite
fuselage or wing because of concerns that such structures wouldin scaling up: Boeing’s Dreamliner and the challenge of socio-
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3.3. Learning about safety and maintenance
In addition to higher production costs, composite components
raised concerns about safety and maintenance costs. For example,
in the late 1970s NASA expressed concern that ﬁbers released in a
ﬁre might interfere with electronic signals (Staff, 1979a). An ex-
tensive testing program put these concerns to rest, but composites
continued to raise questions about lightning strikes. Because alu-
minum airframes conduct electricity easily, current from a lighting
strike ﬂows readily on the aircraft skin and dissipates into the air
without compromising internal electronics. However, because
electricity cannot ﬂow easily through composites, charge from a
lightning strike could build up at the point of contact, and arc to
other points of the plane, destroying electronics. To protect against
such lightning strikes, manufacturers built electrically conductive
layers into composite plies and developed other techniques for
protecting electronics (Tocknell, 2009).
Composites also raised concerns about structural integrity. The
risks of using new materials for aircraft were tragically demon-
strated with the de Havilland Comet, the ﬁrst airliner to use a
pressurized aluminum fuselage at high altitudes. On three sepa-
rate occasions in the mid-1950s, Comet aircraft broke up in mid-
ﬂight as the pressurized fuselage underwent an explosive de-
compression (Marks, 2009). Although the Comet had been sub-
jected to the most rigorous safety testing available to that time,
engineers did not fully understand how the process of pressur-
ization and depressurization would fatigue the metal, leading to
cracks around the plane’s square windows, and eventually struc-
tural failure. Although engineers learned to make oval windows
and use structural reinforcements to make aluminum safe, the
lesson was clear: a new material came with unknown risks.
Even if airlines assumed that composites could be made
structurally safe, they worried that maintenance costs might sky-
rocket. Niche applications of composites provided some opportu-
nity for learning. For example, in 1979 Airbus added various
composite components to four A300s in operation with Lufthansa,
in order to study maintenance costs (Bassett, 1979). Unfortunately,
by the mid-1980s Lufthansa concluded that the costs of main-
taining composite components were twice those of their alumi-
num equivalents. Without easy and non-destructive methods for
testing the integrity of a part, technicians were forced to spend
days on inspection. Unlike aluminum, composites could not be
reshaped, so extensive damage typically required replacing the
entire part (Staff, 1990). This in turn meant that airlines lost ad-
ditional revenue as aircraft were taken out of operation (Staff,
1985). Airlines argued that aircraft manufacturers had not pro-
vided adequate non-destructive testing techniques or worker
training to ensure the safety of composite components (Staff,
1985).
Concerns about the costs and risks of maintenance continued,
especially after the explosive decompression of a Boeing 737 over
Hawaii in 1988 demonstrated that a cracked fuselage could hide
beneath the painted surface of aircraft. Military organizations had
special concerns about how to repair battle-damaged aircraft in
the ﬁeld, and often modiﬁed initial aircraft conﬁgurations to in-
clude less composites as time went on (Younossi et al., 2001, p. 10).
Since the U.S. Defense Department needed lightweight com-
ponents to meet performance goals, it invested in better techni-
ques for inspecting aircraft. For example, in the early 1980s, the Air
Force began developing a facility for robotic inspection, which
would eliminate the need for the airplanes to be disassembled for
inspection. It aimed to cut the inspection time from 3 months to
3 days for a military aircraft, saving at least 50% on inspection costs
(Henderson, 1989). Similar work continued throughout the 1990sPlease cite this article as: Slayton, R., Spinardi, G., Radical innovation
technical transitions. Technovation (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j(McKenna, 1998).
Niche applications thus provided important lessons about de-
tection and repair of composites. Unfortunately, by the late 1990s,
airlines concluded that composites often demonstrated a better
service record than their metal counterparts during the early
period of adoption, but that they were less resistant to impact
damage (McKenna, 1998). While impacts on metal structures
would cause immediately visible damage, impacts to composites
could cause a slow delamination process that was difﬁcult to de-
tect, but could cause a long-term failure (Staff, 2001). The need for
better methods of detecting and repairing damage remained.4. Scaling up composites
We now turn to describing Boeing’s decision to make large
aircraft structural components such as the fuselage and wings, and
the challenges of scaling up composite production; challenges that
in this case demonstrate that establishment of a successful “niche”
does not necessarily mean that an innovation is sufﬁciently ma-
ture to effect regime change.
4.1. The decision to scale up
In short, ongoing concerns about the high costs of production
and maintenance limited the development of large composite
components through the late 1990s. Using MLP concepts, we can
say that landscape pressures (high fuel prices and the Cold War
arms race) nurtured the composites niche (in the form of a market
for small components). Niche innovations (such as improved in-
spection technology and automated tape-laying machines) helped
expand use of composites, but did not enable aircraft manu-
facturers to scale up composite components to a potentially re-
gime-changing size (i.e. fuselage and wing).
Indeed, Boeing’s decision to declare composites mature enough
to create fuselage and wing structures was prompted neither by a
technological breakthrough, nor by landscape pressures such as
rising fuel costs. Instead the initial decision was fueled by a much
more company-speciﬁc problem: Boeing was losing market share
to Airbus.
In the late 1990s, Boeing’s orders were falling while Airbus’s
orders rose, and in 1999 Airbus won more orders than Boeing for
the ﬁrst time. As Boeing felt its incumbency threatened, it became
more willing to take on risks. In March 2001, not long after Airbus
unveiled its A380—to be the world’s largest commercial aircraft—
Boeing announced its new Sonic Cruiser. A radical deviation from
the classic airliner aerodynamic design, this was to be a mid-sized
plane that would ﬂy 15–20% faster than conventional aircraft and
at higher altitudes to enable more direct point-to-point routing.
After the September 2001 attacks on the world trade center,
Boeing abandoned the Sonic Cruiser concept for a more conven-
tional, but very fuel-efﬁcient design, which eventually became the
Dreamliner. On April 26, 2004 Boeing formally launched the
Dreamliner production program based upon 50 ﬁrm orders with
All Nippon Airlines (Staff, 2004).
Even before the Sonic Cruiser became the Dreamliner, Boeing
planned to use composites extensively. More fuel efﬁcient engines
and lighter weight materials were essential to making a faster
plane ﬂy economically, and plans for the Sonic Cruiser included
60% composite structures by weight (Wallace, 2001; Smith, 2002,
2001; Staff, 2001). Although Boeing considered lightweight alu-
minum alloys, it preferred composites for several reasons. Com-
posites enabled the more complex fuselage design that was nee-
ded to increase speed without sacriﬁcing fuel efﬁciency, and re-
sisted corrosion better than aluminum (Barrie, 2003; Dornheim,
2002). Composite structures, unlike aluminum, were strongin scaling up: Boeing’s Dreamliner and the challenge of socio-
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construction could reduce the number of fasteners, thereby re-
ducing noise from fastener-induced turbulence (Staff, 2009).
Some leaders at Boeing also came to see composites as ideal for
a new manufacturing strategy that might reduce costs and time of
producing new aircraft. Mike Bair, a marketing specialist who
became the manager of Boeing’s new aircraft project, argued that
composites would help reduce manufacturing times because
composite components could be cured as seamless wholes (Barrie,
2003; Mecham, 2003a). By avoiding labor-intensive assembly,
Boeing would reduce the total number of U.S. assembly workers
from thousands to 800–1200. As we have seen, composite com-
ponent manufacture was labor-intensive, but Bair aimed to out-
source this part of the job to countries with lower wages. AW&ST
explained: “Relying on large modular assemblies will shift more
jobs down the supply chain (and off Boeing’s payroll, so that bad-
times layoffs happen elsewhere)” (Mecham, 2003b).
Bair was part of a broader shift in Boeing management, which
in the late 1990s established reduced manufacturing times and
costs as a principal goal. Similarly, the head of engineering, man-
ufacturing and partner alignment for the new project, Walt Gill-
ette, directed the Airplane Creation Process Strategy Team in the
late 1990s, aimed at reducing manufacturing times (Wallace,
2001). When Boeing unveiled a ﬁrst prototype fuselage section in
2004, Gillette emphasized that the challenge of the 787 was “not
technical viability, but how to manufacture it at commercial cost”
(Mecham and Sparaco, 2004, p 46).
Gillette’s assurances minimized the safety and manufacturing
risks, implying that composite wings and fuselage were not too
radical for risk-averse airlines. Boeing had an obvious stake in
portraying the Dreamliner as innovative, but not too radical.
However, the question of whether or not scaling up composites to
the size of wings and fuselage constituted “radical” or “incre-
mental” engineering was far from settled, and was contested by
individuals and companies with a clear stake in the outcome.
4.2. Incremental or radical engineering?
Having committed to use of large composite components,
Boeing worked hard to reframe many of the associated risks. For
example, Boeing acknowledged concerns that composites might
not survive “rump rash”—from careless treatment of aircraft by
ground crews—but also highlighted tests showing that some
composite parts, such as door frames, could better withstand im-
pact than their aluminum counterparts. To prove it, Boeing gave
engineers at All Nippon Airlines (ANA) hammers and invited them
to try denting a composite aircraft door. They could not (Mecham
and Sparaco, 2004).
Boeing promised that composites would cut maintenance costs
by 9% and lifecycle costs by 5–6% (Mecham, 2005). Because each
composite component was created as a seamless whole, aircraft
would have fewer parts, both reducing assembly time and main-
tenance. Boeing promised that more durable composites and im-
proved electronic systems would enable 59% fewer cancellations
than the A330—though it also rolled out its most comprehensive
maintenance service ever to support the 787 (Mecham, 2006a, b,
2010).
Some knowledgeable industry insiders viewed Boeing’s opti-
mism skeptically. Early on, Boeing’s manufacturing partner Vought
Aircraft Industries noted that making the parts affordably would
“require major breakthroughs in materials technologies and
manufacturing processes that currently do not exist” (Phillips,
2002). AWS&T noted that despite Boeing’s “breezy attitude that
carbon ﬁber is old hat,” the manufacturing difﬁculties were im-
mense: “Notwithstanding carbon ﬁber's earlier use in the tail ﬁns,
Boeing’s radical application makes it essentially a new material forPlease cite this article as: Slayton, R., Spinardi, G., Radical innovation
technical transitions. Technovation (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/airliners" (Staff, 2005, 58).
Indeed, because composite materials and components are
created at one and the same time, large composite components
raised new questions about safety. These concerns erupted pub-
licly in 2007 when a Boeing engineer, Vincent A. Weldon, claimed
he was ﬁred because he raised legitimate questions about the
crashworthiness of the 787. Weldon claimed that Boeing was
covering-up problems and ﬁled a whistleblower complaint with
the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. He also
wrote and publicized a long letter to the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) (Weldon, 2007). Boeing denied the accusation
and claimed that Weldon was ﬁred for threatening and racist
comments made towards an African-American executive. Wel-
don’s whistleblower complaint was denied on the grounds that
Boeing was complying with all FAA regulations, but his concerns
attracted broad media attention, including an interview with Dan
Rather on 60 minutes (Gates, 2007).
Were carbon ﬁber fuselages and wings radical departures or
incremental advancements from the established niche? Far from
being obvious categories of analysis, the notions of “radical” or
“mature” technologies were actively contested by stakeholders.
Nonetheless, Boeing’s tribulations with the development of com-
posite aircraft suggest that some aspects of the 787 did indeed
require radical engineering.
4.3. In pursuit of the dreamliner
Boeing’s project began auspiciously. In 2003, Boeing began
contracting for speciﬁc parts of the 787. The Japanese ﬁrms Mit-
subishi, Kawasaki, and Fuji provided the wing box, forward por-
tions of the fuselage, landing gear, wing ﬁxed trailing edge, center
wing box, and wheel well for the main landing gear. The Italian
ﬁrm Alenia teamed with the U.S. Vought to build the horizontal
stabilizer and portions of the fuselage (Mecham, 2003c). To
streamline production, Boeing created a tiered supply chain that
would deliver parts pre-integrated. For example, Spirit Aero-
systems would deliver the forward portion of the fuselage to
Everett with the cockpit fully “stuffed” with electronics and con-
trols (Tang and Zimmerman, 2009). Boeing would then rapidly
“snap together” each aircraft from just seven parts—two wings,
three fuselage sections, the horizontal stabilizer, and the vertical
ﬁn—and complete the systems integration in just two to three days
(Mecham, 2003b).
In spring 2007, as parts began arriving for ﬁnal assembly,
Boeing publicized its streamlined factory in Everett, Washington.
The fully stuffed aircraft sections would pause at station zero for
24 hours so that they could equilibrate to the ambient tempera-
tures. At the ﬁrst station (also called the “big bang” station), a
massive machine—the Mother of All Tools Tower (MOATT)—would
lift the rear fuselage sections, horizontal stabilizers and vertical ﬁn
and attach them to the airplane (Mecham, 2007b). At the second
position, workers would add engines and main landing gear,
connect electrical systems between each of the sections, and turn
on power. The aircraft could then roll itself forward, and the third
station would be used to ﬁnish testing (Wallace, 2007).
Boeing promised ANA that the ﬁrst airplane would be delivered
in May 2008 (Mecham, 2011; Schoﬁeld, 2010b). But in 2007, the
schedule began to slip. Because several suppliers were behind
schedule, composite components were shipped with “traveled
work” to be completed at Boeing’s factory in Everett, Washington
(Norris, 2007). Boeing chose a splashy date, 7/8/07, to roll out the
787 for the ﬁrst time, but the plane that rolled out on July 8 was a
“Potemkin 787”—it had no interior (Staff, 2008). Managers none-
theless promised that Dreamliner’s ﬁrst ﬂight would come in late
August or mid-September (Mecham, 2007a; Staff, 2007a). On
September 5 program manager Mike Blair acknowledged that ﬁrstin scaling up: Boeing’s Dreamliner and the challenge of socio-
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by compressing ﬂight testing to even less than the originally
planned eight months—already the shortest ﬂight testing program
in Boeing’s history (Staff, 2007b). On October 10, Boeing was
forced to acknowledge a six month schedule slip (Mecham,
2008a). More bad news was forthcoming; by 2011, Boeing had
changed the schedule eight times (Schoﬁeld, 2010a; Mecham,
2011). Boeing ﬁnally gained FAA and European aviation safety
agency approval in August 2011, and delivered the ﬁrst airplane to
ANA in September 2011.
Why did Boeing struggle to build the Dreamliner? Industry
observers and management scholars criticized Boeing’s supply
chain management for failing to create appropriate incentives for
suppliers, and for making it difﬁcult to anticipate problems (Tang
and Zimmerman, 2009; Peterson, 2011; Madslien, 2010). Boeing’s
management team had no experience with supply chain man-
agement (although that changed when program manager Mike
Bair was replaced with Pat Shanahan in 2007). Outsourcing con-
tributed to labor unrest which further slowed the program (Tang
and Zimmerman, 2009).
Yet the Dreamliner’s woes were not solely a result of poor
management. They also stemmed from the intrinsic challenges of
scaling up composite components to unprecedented sizes. As the
following section shows, the radical innovations required to
overcome these challenges could not be happen in the market
niche of small components.
4.4. Innovations in the process of scaling up
Despite decades of experience with composites manufacture,
Boeing’s suppliers needed to develop new equipment and tech-
niques to manufacture composite fuselages and wings. For ex-
ample, manufacturers built unprecedentedly large autoclaves to
carefully control pressure and temperatures. Kawasaki built a 17
meter autoclave to cure fuselage sections that were 9 or 10 meters
long, while Mitsubishi built an autoclave with an interior length of
36 meters in order to cure wingboxes (Norris, 2010b).
More problematically, integral stringers—supporting structures
that are bonded to the skins they support, forming a single piece—
proved to be very difﬁcult to work into the complex wing and
fuselage shapes (Perrett and Mechamo, 2007). In August 2009,
Boeing discovered wrinkles in the fuselage sections produced by
Alenia, which were caused by limitations in the stringer trimming
machine. The stringer edges were supposed to be reduced in steps
of 0.015 in., but the machine was unable to achieve this precise
trimming, causing wrinkles during the curing process. Boeing and
Alenia planned to ﬁx the problem by patching the pieces with
extra plies (Norris, 2009a).
Similarly, because manufacturers struggled to build huge parts
to extremely precise tolerances, shims were used to ﬁll some of
the inevitable gaps between parts. However, in 2010, engineers
discovered that Alenia had applied pressure improperly to shims
intended to ﬁll gaps between the horizontal stabilizers and the
center box joining them. The gaps were particularly troubling
because they were “deeply embedded” in the tail piece, and had
passed undetected into the ﬁnal assembly. The resulting stresses
threatened the structural integrity of the tail piece, forcing a
temporary stop to ﬂight tests in 2010 (Norris, 2010a).
Boeing addressed renewed concerns about the effects of
lightning strikes on composite structures by developing a pro-
prietary bronze–phosphor mesh system to protect against such
risks. But during the manufacturing process, Boeing became con-
cerned that gaps between metal fasteners and composite com-
ponents developed by Mitsubishi might cause electrical arcing in
the event of a lightning strike. Boeing and Mitsubishi worked to-
gether to redesign special-purpose fasteners that would seal morePlease cite this article as: Slayton, R., Spinardi, G., Radical innovation
technical transitions. Technovation (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/jtightly and thus reduce the risk of arcing, but the resulting fastener
shortage put the project behind schedule (Mecham and Norris,
2007). Boeing was forced to use 10,000 temporary fasteners, each
circled in red, in order to assemble its ﬁrst aircraft (Mecham,
2008b).
The process of ﬁnding and refastening each fastener created
considerable stress for the leaned-down workforce at Everett. At-
taching fasteners to composites is more challenging than with
metal, because it is easy to apply stresses that damage the mate-
rial. Making matters worse, technicians were forced to replace
fasteners twice because removal of the temporary fasteners cre-
ated metal swarf, which prevented the ﬁrst set of replacement
fasteners from sealing close to the composite material (Marshall,
2009). In 2008, industry observers noted that Boeing’s once-im-
pressive assembly line looked like a “hospital emergency room,”
covered with scaffolding that the more streamlined process should
have rendered obsolete (Mecham and Norris, 2008).
Most alarmingly, the process of scaling up revealed erroneous
knowledge about how large composite structures would respond
to stress. One week before the already-delayed ﬁrst ﬂight test in
June 2009, ground tests revealed unexpected structural weak-
nesses. When pressure was applied to the wings of the test air-
craft, titanium fasteners did not transfer the load properly, causing
delamination of the carbon ﬁber plies and deﬂection inside the
fuselage. The failure was especially troubling because computer
models had not predicted it. The data which had been sent from
Boeing headquarters to suppliers around the world, and was the
basis for engineering the entire aircraft, suddenly appeared to be
ﬂawed (Mecham, 2009). The 787’s ﬁrst ﬂight was pushed back to
December 2009 (Norris, 2009b).
Finally, the development of the ﬁrst commercial all-composite
fuselage and wings entailed new techniques and routines for
maintenance. Boeing developed a new training curriculum, com-
posite patches that could be bonded to surfaces to ﬁx minor da-
mage, and hand-held scanners for testing structural integrity
(Norris, 2010c). While the FAA authorized 787 repairs using
composite patches fused to the surface, the European Aviation
Safety Agency (EASA) rejected this type of repair, insisting that
repairs entail bolted metal patches (Kingsley-Jones, 2010). Non-
standard fabrication methods for different aircraft components,
combined with different maintenance guidelines from Boeing and
Airbus, and the proprietary status of structural data, raised con-
cerns about expensive maintenance routines (Chandler, 2012a, b;
Wall, 2011a).
In short, even after decades of experience in the carbon ﬁber
niche, the process of scaling up composite components required
massive levels of innovation: new technologies for mitigating
lightning strikes; new types of fasteners; new knowledge about
how large composite structures respond to stress; and new man-
ufacturing techniques requiring unprecedentedly large equipment.
The fact that some structural knowledge could not be extrapolated
from small composite components to larger components, suggests
that Boeing did go beyond incremental engineering to what Vin-
centi terms “radical design”. Boeing’s supply chain strategy am-
pliﬁed these difﬁculties by separating manufacturing teams from
ﬁnal assembly teams (a separation that experience with compo-
sites should have cautioned against), but it did not create the
challenges associated with scaling up.5. Discussion
In this section we return to the question of whether the multi-
level perspective (MLP) provides an adequate heuristic for un-
derstanding transitions. We draw on our case study of Boeing’s
development of composite materials to highlight some limitationsin scaling up: Boeing’s Dreamliner and the challenge of socio-
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5.1. Niches and the challenge of scaling up
As the foregoing account suggests, the MLP and niche man-
agement frameworks can partially account for the development of
carbon ﬁber aircraft components. Military aviation and small
components of commercial aircraft both provided niches for ex-
perimentation, learning, innovation, and developing a social net-
work surrounding composite manufacture and use. Landscape
developments—ﬁrst Cold War aerospace competition, and then
concerns about rising fuel costs—encouraged adoption of niche
innovations in composites.
However, the Dreamliner experience also suggests the need for
revisions to sociotechnical transitions theories such as the MLP. In
such theories, radical innovation only occurs in niches, and is
subsequently “selected” or “adopted” by the dominant regime.
However, this was not possible for composites. Innovations which
many stakeholders regarded as “radical” were needed to make
composite components of a scale that could potentially effect re-
gime change.
Carbon ﬁber is just one example of how “opening the black
box” of technology may help to reﬁne and expand theories of in-
novation and sociotechnical transitions. Existing frameworks ef-
fectively “black box” technical design in explaining how transi-
tions occur. In perhaps the most detailed discussion of different
transition pathways, Geels and Schot (2007) argue that transitions
vary depending on whether the niche innovation is disruptive or
symbiotic with the existing regime, and upon whether the niche is
mature when landscape pressures for change emerge. The result-
ing typology of transitions (shown in Box 1) makes no reference to
speciﬁc technological features of the innovation. In other words,
existing frameworks for transitions treat new technological in-
novations as a kind of black box. There is no a-priori reason to
expect that innovations in, for example, information technology,
cause transitions any differently than innovations in other areas,
such as automobiles.
However, the case presented here suggests that aspects of
technological design do affect the ways in which transitions occur.
The Dreamliner experience shows that one speciﬁc aspect of niche
innovation is particularly relevant: the degree to which additional
radical innovation is required in the process of scaling up from
niche to regime levels.
Box 1–Typology of transition pathways, with examples (Geels
and Schot, 2007)
 Transformation: When there are moderate landscape
pressures, but niche innovations are too immature to
compete with regime technologies, transitions occur as
regime actors slowly nurture and then adopt niche
innovations. Geels and Schot (2007) provide the example
of a transition in Dutch sanitation, in which the dominant
regime slowly adopted niche innovations associated with
sewer systems. The transition required only an “add-on to
existing knowledge” rather than “disruptive” innovation
(Geels and Schot 2007, p. 408).
 Dealignment and realignment: When there are sudden
landscape pressures, but niche innovations are too
immature to compete, several niche innovations emerge
and co-exist until one becomes dominant. Geels and Schot
(2007) provide the example of the late 19th century horse-
based transportation regime in the U.S., which faced
challenges that created opportunities for multiple niche
innovations. An innovation in mass production—the Ford
factory—was needed for automobiles to become the basisPlease cite this article as: Slayton, R., Spinardi, G., Radical innovation
technical transitions. Technovation (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/of a new transportation regime, and adjustments in the
socio-technical system (such as drive-through restaurants
and theaters) supported this transition. However, in Geels
and Schot’s account, few changes to the automobile itself
were required; the auto was adopted more or less “as-is.”
 Technological substitution. When there are sudden land-
scape pressures, and niche innovations are mature enough
to compete with regime technologies, transitions come
about as regime actors adopt economically superior niche
technologies. Geels and Schot (2007) provide the example
of the transition from sailing ships to steamships. Several
niche applications of steamships (e.g. inland waterways
and ports) provided opportunities for innovations that
incrementally improved steamship performance. These
innovations eventually enabled steamboats to become
economically competitive with, and thereby to replace,
sailing ships. While “many adjustments in the socio-
technical regime followed the breakthrough of steam-
ships,” (Geels and Schot 2007, p. 411) this regime change
did not require radical innovations in steamships. Rather,
scaling up from niche to regime required incremental
improvements in economic competitiveness, and the
production of more steamships.
 Reconfiguration: When there is no landscape pressure,
niche innovations may nonetheless be slowly adopted for
economic reasons. Geels and Schot (2007) give the
example of the transition from traditional to mass-produc-
tion factories, which was enabled by multiple innovations
in multiple niches, such as small battery-driven electric
motors and conveyor belts. These niche technologies were
initially adopted by the traditional factory regime to solve
small problems, and eventually Henry Ford integrated
them into a new kind of factory regime. This transition
required innovation in the form of “new combinations of
existing elements,” (Geels and Schot 2007, p. 413) not a
radical innovation in the elements themselves.
The MLP has not acknowledged this aspect of technological
design previously, not only because it does not encourage analysts
to open the black box of technology, but also because it has gen-
erally been applied to a speciﬁc type of scaling up, which we
provisionally refer to as “modular scaling up.” In modular scaling
up, mass production of a niche “product innovation” enables re-
gime change by multiplying the number of artifacts in use. Since
technology is more than just an artifact, modular scaling up also
requires increases in the size of systems for production, ﬁnancing,
and other supporting components, and such increases may entail
“process innovations,” such as improvements in materials. How-
ever, in modular scaling up, the ﬁnal product delivered to the
sociotechnical system does not change radically; rather, its in-
stances are multiplied. Most if not all accounts using the MLP
perspective focus on transitions that require only modular scaling
up. For example, in each of the cases used to exemplify the MLP
typology of transition pathways, transitions are portrayed as oc-
curring when niche or regime actors multiplied the number of
technologies in use, and thus do not require radical innovation
after niche development (see Box 1).
Modular scaling up may require incremental adjustments in
the socio-technical regime; as Geels notes, the selection of new
technologies by regimes is “more than adoption” because users
“also have to integrate new technologies in their practices, orga-
nisations and routines, something which involves learning, ad-
justments and ‘domestication’…” (Geels, 2002, p. 1259). In other
words, the sociotechnical regime may need to change in order to
fully allow the integration of niche technologies. However, mod-
ular scaling up does not require additional radical innovation inin scaling up: Boeing’s Dreamliner and the challenge of socio-
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By contrast, the scaling up of composite components required
much more innovation in the niche technology itself. In such
“systemic scaling up,” niche or regime actors must increase the
size and complexity of the technology itself in order to effect a
regime change. In such cases, we might say that “process in-
novations” are themselves scaled up. Although the development of
large and complex systems is an incremental process in some
ways, it can require radical innovations in others. For example, the
Facebook social networking site could not have expanded from a
college campus to a world-wide user base without innovations in
managing massive amounts of data and network trafﬁc (Pingdom,
2010). Most large software systems confront similar challenges
(Slayton, 2013; Brooks, 1995). Similarly, Grünewald et al. (2012)
have noted that distributed energy storage does not ﬁt neatly into
existing paradigms for sociotechnical transitions, because it sup-
ports a larger system and does not aim to replace an existing
technology. While niche applications of distributed storage (such
as electric vehicles) are crucial, the systemic nature of this tech-
nology means that additional radical innovation is likely to be
necessary to scale up distributed storage to a regime-changing
scale. These are all examples of technologies that can only effect
regime change by increasing the scale and not simply the number
of artifacts in existence. Transitions that require systemic scaling
up confront unique challenges, and merit further attention.
5.2. Broadening sociotechnical transitions theory with STS
The case presented here also illustrates three methodological
points that may help sociotechnical transitions theory more fully
account for transition processes such as systemic up scaling. First,
accounts of sociotechnical transitions would do well to “open the
black box” and consider how the detailed workings of technology
inﬂuence transitions. Without looking closely at the processes of
manufacturing composites and developing new aircraft, it would
be impossible to understand the kinds of innovation needed to
enable a transition.
Second, this account reinforces the point that the structural,
global theory of the MLP “needs to be complemented by local
theories which help to analyze how actors navigate, struggle and
negotiate on speciﬁc alternatives” (Geels and Schot 2010, p. 101).
As we have seen, far from representing a stable analysts’ category,
the “radical” nature of the innovations required to scale up com-
posites was contested by organizations and actors with an interest
in how those innovations were portrayed. Boeing wanted to ap-
pear innovative, but not too radical for a risk-averse industry.
Some engineers and industry observers contested Boeing’s por-
trayal of composite fuselages and wings as a safe and incremental
innovation. Government regulators entered into the fray, and
while they ruled that composites are safe, nobody can yet predict
how composites will hold up in the long term. Perhaps the
greatest indication that something “radical” was at work is the fact
that the process of scaling up produced new knowledge; con-
sistent with Walter Vincenti’s (1993) notion of “radical design,”
structural failures demonstrated that knowledge extrapolated
from small composite components was inadequate for purposes of
scaling up. Nonetheless, the radical nature of the Dreamliner is
very much a matter of perspective. From a consumer perspective,
the use of carbon ﬁber does not appear radical at all; aside from
enabling larger windows, carbon ﬁber does not look much differ-
ent than aluminum. Operators, however, face radical maintenance
challenges in comparison with aluminum.
Third, this study illustrates how accounts of incomplete, partial,
or failed transitions can help reﬁne theories of sociotechnical
transitions, by calling attention to previously neglected challenges
in scaling up from niche to regime levels. With regard to theirPlease cite this article as: Slayton, R., Spinardi, G., Radical innovation
technical transitions. Technovation (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/jlong-term success, the jury is still out on composite airliners. In
2010, Boeing began a three-year process of fatigue testing the 787,
putting a prototype in a cage and applying frequent pressures to
simulate the process of aging (Norris, 2010d). It has yet to an-
nounce the results. Furthermore, problems with composite man-
ufacturing have continued to surface since the 787 entered service.
For example, in February 2012, Boeing discovered that workers
had failed to put shims in place between the aft fuselage and its
internal structure, creating stresses that could increase the long-
term risks of delamination (Mecham, 2012). In July 2012, cracks
developed in the fan case of a General Electric GEnx engine, a
lightweight design unique for its all composite case and composite
blades (Barnett, 2012). Just two months later, maintenance crews
discovered cracks in the fan mid-shaft (George, 2012). In March
2014, Boeing reported hairline cracks in the wings of 40 aircraft
still in the manufacturing phase, which emerged after Mitsubishi
modiﬁed its manufacturing process (Scott and Hepher, 2014).
Some observers remain hesitant about composites. As the CEO
of GKN Aerospace and Land Systems, Marcus Bryson, explained:
Fifty percent of our business still includes metallics. … There is
still a view [at GKN] that composites are not the be-all-and-end-
all. Airbus and Boeing are also nervous about whether you can
industrialize for production of 50 composite narrowbodies per
month. The metals story is not over (Wall, 2011b).
Nonetheless, Boeing’s decision to embrace large-scale compo-
sites production has encouraged a shift towards lighter, more fuel-
efﬁcient aircraft. After initially criticizing Boeing’s use of compo-
sites, Airbus began emphasizing that its 2010–2012 generation
aircraft would sport all-composite wings and fuselage (Wall,
2005). Louis Gallois, the CEO of Airbus’s parent company, ex-
plained that airlines had come to associate composites with
modern aircraft: “it’s partly fashion” (Wall, 2008).
Fashion or not, the Dreamliner entailed billions of dollars of
investment in manufacturing infrastructure which is likely to see
increasing use (for representative investments, see (Sekigawa,
2004; Nativi, 2007; Parmalee 2004). Boeing has developed tech-
nological and management capabilities that can be applied to fu-
ture aircraft. In 2007 analysts predicted aerospace industry de-
mand for composites to quadruple in 20 years (Phillips, 2007).6. Conclusions and policy implications
This paper has used the history of composite aircraft compo-
nents to examine theories of innovation and sociotechnical tran-
sitions. As we have seen, the multi-level perspective offers a
helpful, but limited heuristic for understanding technological
transitions. Niche applications of composites did provide useful
experience for developing all-composite wings and fuselage.
However, the process of scaling up from niche to regime level
required that composites undergo additional “radical” innovation
which could not be accomplished in the niche alone. This case
does not ﬁt neatly within existing paradigms for sociotechnical
transitions, which acknowledge that the sociotechnical regime
may need to adapt to niche technologies, but assume that the
niche innovation can be “selected” or “adopted” by the regime
with very little additional change once it is mature. Indeed, the
purpose of a niche is to allow radical innovation that is unlikely to
thrive in the existing regime. Experience with the Dreamliner
suggests the need to modify this paradigm to account for tech-
nologies that may require considerable innovation to scale up from
the niche to regime level.
Our ﬁndings are particularly relevant to understanding the
challenges facing commercialization of radical innovations (for ex-
ample, in materials, nanotechnology, and biotechnology). The clas-
sic distinction between process and product innovations may bein scaling up: Boeing’s Dreamliner and the challenge of socio-
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technologies may require signiﬁcant further process innovation to
enable the development of products customized to a particular
market requirement. While production techniques may eventually
become “black-boxed,” initial value creation is challenging because
it requires both process and product innovation.
Two broad policy implications follow from the methods and
ﬁndings of this paper. First, policies should not be directed to-
wards nurturing niches in general, but should target the types of
niches that will allow the most needed kinds of innovation. An
understanding of what types of niches are most needed can only
be achieved by opening the black box of technology to understand
how the content of technological design affects barriers to adop-
tion. In the case of composites, policies which nurtured the market
niche of small components were insufﬁcient to produce the radical
innovation needed to scale up to large components. A research and
development niche that focused on the producibility and main-
tainability of large components more speciﬁcally would have been
more effective.
Second, policies should not target niche innovation alone, on
the assumption that the market will select or adopt niche in-
novations when they are sufﬁciently mature. Some kinds of radical
innovation cannot take place in niches alone; thus policies should
sustain the ongoing innovation that is needed to scale up from
niche to regime level. We argue that this is especially likely to be
the case when the process of scaling up is systemic rather than
modular; in such cases, unexpected interactions are likely to at-
tend the growth of complexity, and will require signiﬁcant in-
novation beyond the niche.
In the case of composites, policies might include the continued
exertion of pressures for the adoption of lighter weight materials
(e.g. a carbon tax); investing in maintenance technologies; for-
mulating standards for maintenance; and providing ﬁnancial
backing for companies that take on risky production jobs. How-
ever, such policies are likely to be controversial. One reason that
Japanese companies were able to compete favorably for 787 con-
tracts was that the Japanese government provided backing for the
companies, and many observers object to such support as a vio-
lation of international competitiveness rules. Boeing and Airbus
are currently in a WTO dispute about whether their respective
governments have given the companies unfair economic assis-
tance (Pritchard and MacPherson, 2009).
These recommendations stem from an approach to analyzing
transitions that acknowledges the heuristic value of socico-
technical transitions theory, but seeks to go further by unpicking
the particularities of speciﬁc technological developments. The
same factors that have made theories such as the MLP so suc-
cessful—its clear conceptualization of the overarching structural
interactions involved in transitions—can also be a weakness if the
framework is adopted unthinkingly as a template for under-
standing all types of technological transitions. As the composites
case shows, transitions can come about in different ways. If so-
ciotechnical transitions theory is to be a truly useful tool for ana-
lysis and policy advice then further investigation is needed into
how transition pathways vary across different types of innovation.Acknowledgments
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